The International Organization of Securities Commissions has urged financial firms to begin preparing for the risks that quantum computing could pose to cryptography used across financial markets. Reuters reported on November 19 that IOSCO warned a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could undermine secure communications and other critical functions within the next five years. The organisation brings together securities regulators from more than 130 jurisdictions. Its warning is not a claim that today’s quantum computers can already break all widely used encryption, but an instruction to treat the transition to quantum-resistant systems as a long-term resilience project that needs to begin before a crisis.
Quantum computers use different computational principles from conventional machines and may eventually solve certain mathematical problems far more efficiently. Some of the public-key cryptography used to establish secure connections and authenticate digital activity relies on problems that could become vulnerable to sufficiently capable quantum systems. The risk is not limited to one application. Financial institutions depend on cryptography for customer authentication, secure messaging, transaction integrity, software updates and connections to external providers. The IOSCO warning shows the potential impact on financial-market infrastructure and blockchain-based systems. The original reporting on Quantum computing sets out the primary development.
The warning is about long migration lead times
The time horizon is important because replacing cryptographic systems is rarely a simple software update. Banks, exchanges, clearing houses, payment networks and cloud providers use many products that may contain cryptographic libraries or protocols. Some systems are managed by vendors, while others are embedded in hardware or legacy applications. A transition requires identifying where vulnerable algorithms are used, selecting approved alternatives, testing interoperability and coordinating changes across organisations. A company that waits until a quantum computer becomes a practical threat may discover that its systems cannot be migrated quickly enough.
One concern is the possibility of attackers collecting encrypted data now and attempting to decrypt it later if quantum capabilities improve. This is often described as a harvest-now, decrypt-later risk. Information that remains sensitive for many years may be exposed even if it is encrypted with strong algorithms today. Financial firms should So consider the expected lifetime of the data they protect, the sensitivity of customer and market information, and the time required to replace cryptographic dependencies. The risk varies by data type and system, so a blanket migration schedule may not be appropriate. Further technical context for IOSCO is available in the supporting documentation.
How quantum risk changes migration planning
Blockchain systems face a different coordination challenge. A decentralised network may rely on cryptographic signatures that are used by thousands of participants and applications. Upgrading those mechanisms can require changes to protocols, wallets, exchanges, custody providers and user infrastructure. IOSCO warned that this migration could be particularly difficult because no single organisation controls every part of a decentralised network. A technical upgrade may be possible, but coordinating adoption and managing old and new formats can create operational and governance problems. Financial institutions face a more immediate supplier-security question in Third-Party Breach Exposes Financial Customer Information Linked to Chase, Visa and Mastercard, which reports on a third-party data exposure.
The regulator also cautioned against quantum washing, a term for overstating the maturity or capability of quantum technology. Financial firms may encounter vendors marketing quantum solutions that do not have showd performance or a clear security benefit. Procurement teams should distinguish between research announcements, experimental hardware and systems that have been independently tested for a defined use case. The same discipline applies to post-quantum security products: a vendor should explain which standards it supports, how keys are managed and whether its implementation has undergone appropriate review.
Blockchain systems face coordination challenges
IOSCO’s recommendation to engage suppliers is significant because many financial services rely on software and infrastructure that institutions do not build themselves. A bank may depend on a cloud provider, a core-banking vendor, a payment processor and a security platform, each with its own cryptographic roadmap. The institution needs to understand which supplier is responsible for each component and how migration will be coordinated. Contracts and resilience plans can require disclosure of cryptographic dependencies, support timelines and testing evidence, but those obligations must be backed by ongoing oversight. The source coverage of Financial cybersecurity provides the underlying detail.
The warning is best understood as a call to begin inventory and planning rather than an instruction to replace every encryption system immediately. Financial firms should map cryptographic use, identify long-lived sensitive data, follow standards guidance and test migration paths with critical suppliers. The transition may take years because it affects technology, governance and customer-facing services. Starting early can reduce the risk of rushed changes later. Quantum computing remains an evolving field, but the potential consequences for trust in financial systems make preparation a current risk-management issue.